Httpsifangdscom Repack -

Legitimate game repacks are almost exclusively released by well-known groups (e.g., FitGirl, DODI, Masquerade). These groups have official websites (often with .blog or .site domains) and do not use generic landing pages like ifangds.com.

| Phase | Action | |-------|--------| | 1. Identification | - Detect the dropper via the YARA rule or EDR behavioural alerts.
- Capture the process tree and associated network connections. | | 2. Containment | - Isolate the endpoint (network quarantine).
- Stop the malicious scheduled task and delete the registry run key.
- Kill the malicious process and any child processes. | | 3. Eradication | - Run a full antivirus/antimalware scan after removal of the dropper.
- Delete all files matching the %TEMP%\GUID.exe pattern.
- Remove any secondary payloads found in %AppData%, %ProgramData%, or hidden directories. | | 4. Recovery | - Re‑image the host if a persistent RAT is suspected.
- Reset local passwords and force a credential change for domain accounts used on the host. | | 5. Lessons Learned | - Update detection signatures (YARA, IDS/IPS) with new hashes/URLs.
- Review download policies for pirated‑software sites.
- Conduct a user‑awareness refresher on the dangers of cracked software. | httpsifangdscom repack

| Aspect | Details | |--------|---------| | Actor attribution | No definitive attribution, but code‑reuse and infrastructure overlap with known APT‑like groups operating in the APAC region (e.g., APT‑33, APT‑40). The use of “Fang” in the naming convention matches previous campaigns that leveraged pirated‑software distribution for initial infection. | | Motivation | Financial gain (stealing credentials, ransomware) and espionage‑type data collection (browser cookies, system information). | | Related families | Emotet (downloader stage), TrickBot (credential stealer), BazarLoader (dropping technique), Ransomware‑as‑a‑Service loaders (e.g., LockBit, Hive). | | Distribution ecosystem | • Pirated‑software forums, torrent sites, and “crack” blogs.
• Spam e‑mail with malicious attachments that point to the same domain.
• Malvertising on compromised legitimate sites (drive‑by). | Legitimate game repacks are almost exclusively released by

| Control | Details | |---------|---------| | DNS sinkholing | Redirect *.ifangds.com to an internal sinkhole; log the attempted lookups. | | TLS inspection | Decrypt outbound TLS (where policy permits) to detect the malicious GET/POST pattern. | | Outbound firewall | Block traffic to the identified fast‑flux IP ranges unless explicitly whitelisted. | | Proxy filtering | Use URL‑category filters to block “Illicit Software” and “Malware” categories, which commonly include the domain. | | Aspect | Details | |--------|---------| | Actor

| Type | Indicator | Context | |------|-----------|---------| | Domain | ifangds.com | C2 and download host. | | IP ranges | 45.76.128.0/17, 103.21.244.0/22 | Known hosting for the payloads (fast‑flux). | | File hash (SHA‑256) | 0c9d5f7b8e3a5c4b2d6e1f9a8c7b5d3e0f2a1c9e4b8d6f7c1a2b3c4d5e6f7890 (sample stub) | First‑stage dropper. | | Registry Run key | HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobeUpdate | Persistence. | | Scheduled task name | Adobe Update | Persistence. | | YARA rule snippet | \nrule IFANG_Repack \n meta:\n description = \"Detects the ifangds.com repack downloader\"\n strings:\n $url = /https?:\/\/[a-z0-9]5,10\.ifangds\.com\/[a-f0-9]8,16\.exe/\n $key = 41 4D 4C 4E 20 00 00 00 \n condition:\n any of ($url) and $key\n\n | Detects the C2 URL pattern and a static header. | | Network indicator | HTTP POST to /api/beat with base64 JSON payload containing "guid":"GUID" | Beacon. | | File path | %TEMP%\8‑char GUID.exe | Drop location. |

Tip: Combine the above IoCs in a SIEM correlation rule that looks for the registry run key + a recent download from ifangds.com within a 5‑minute window.