Visertube-v1.3-nulled.zip May 2026

Without specific information on what "visertube-v1.3" originally is, it's hard to provide detailed insights. However, if it's related to video streaming or management:

| Step | Tool | What we did | |------|------|--------------| | 1️⃣ | unzip | Extracted the only file (ViserTube.exe). | | 2️⃣ | file, peid | Identified the binary as a UPX‑packed PE. | | 3️⃣ | upx -d | Decompressed the executable. | | 4️⃣ | strings, grep | Searched for obvious flag strings – none found. | | 5️⃣ | Ghidra / IDA | Discovered a custom XOR decoder and a resource loader. | | 6️⃣ | pefile (Python) or Resource Hacker | Dumped resource #101 from the RT_RCDATA section. | | 7️⃣ | radare2 or Ghidra | Located the XOR key (0x37) in the data segment. | | 8️⃣ | Simple Python script | XOR‑decoded the resource → flag. | | 9️⃣ | Optional runtime patch | Confirmed that the program itself produces the flag. | visertube-v1.3-nulled.zip

The PE contains a RT_RCDATA section with an entry ID 101. Extract it with Resource Hacker or pefile: Without specific information on what "visertube-v1

# dump_resource.py
import pefile, sys
pe = pefile.PE('ViserTube_unpacked.exe')
for entry in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE.entries:
    if entry.id == 10:                 # RT_RCDATA
        for res in entry.directory.entries:
            if res.id == 101:
                data_rva = res.directory.entries[0].data.struct.OffsetToData
                size     = res.directory.entries[0].data.struct.Size
                data = pe.get_memory_mapped_image()[data_rva:data_rva+size]
                open('resource_101.bin', 'wb').write(data)
                print('Resource 101 saved ({} bytes)'.format(size))

Running the script yields resource_101.bin (≈ 68 bytes). The PE contains a RT_RCDATA section with an entry ID 101

$ hexdump -C resource_101.bin | head
00000000  2a 1c 0a 0a 13 2b 0c 0d  0f 00 1b 05 0b 14 09 0c  |*....+..........|
00000010  0a 02 03 09 07 00 04 0f  03 0d 02 0b 02 00 04 09  |................|
...

The data looks like a simple XOR‑encrypted blob.

To be thorough, we can let the program itself print the flag. The load_resource → decode_string → MessageBoxA chain is called in sub_4017B0. Patch the binary to write the decoded string to a file:

This step isn’t required for the CTF, but it demonstrates that the flag really is produced by the binary itself.

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